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On April 22, 1990, an estimated 200 million people from 140 nations participated in the 
reenactment of Earth Day on its twentieth anniversary. While the day’s events once again focused on 
"corporate destruction of the environment"2, its tone was markedly different from that of the original 
event. Where the first Earth Day angrily denounced corporations as unwelcome villains, the 1990 Earth 
Day fully embraced them as invited partners. Through funding of the day’s events and staging of special 
demonstrations of their green activities, corporations were prominent participants and organizing 
supporters of the largely peaceful event. This led The New York Times to observe that “this multi-million 
dollar orchestration of the event bore little resemblance to the grass roots movement driving the event 
twenty years before.”3 Time called the event "a commercial mugging."4   
Explicit in these observations is the sentiment that corporations had co-opted Earth Day and, by 
inference, the environmental movement as a whole. Implicit in these observations is a statement that 
corporations are not a legitimate member of the environmental movement. Indeed, there is a great deal of 
tension in today’s environmental movement about the relationship between environmental non-
governmental organizations (ENGOs) and corporations.  A recent book by Christine MacDonald, the 
former media manager at Conservation International, expresses outrage at ENGOs accepting donations 
from oil, lumber and mining industries without holding them accountable for ongoing pollution practices. 
In her book, Green Inc. An Environmental Insider Reveals How a Good Cause Has Gone Bad, 
MacDonald charges that the association between ENGOs and corporations has lead to a system of co-
optation, where the outcome is assisted greenwashing. This is but the tip of an iceberg of concern over the 
growing connections between the corporate and non-profit sectors on the environment. Even long-time 
environmentalist, Yale School of Forestry and Environmental Studies’ Dean James Gustave Speth, 
criticizes today’s environmental movement for its willingness to work “within the system” through 
“pragmatic and incremental” actions rather than “deeper approaches to change.” “What is needed,” he 
states, “is transformative change in the system itself.”5 
A schism seems to be emerging between two camps: the dark greens and the bright greens. The 
dark green ENGOs seek radical social change to solve environmental problems, often by confronting 
corporations.6 The bright green ENGOs work within the present system, often in close alliance with 
corporations, to solve environmental problems.7 The article “Harnessing Purity and Pragmatism” in the 
fall 2007 issue of the Stanford Social Innovation Review describes the core of this schism as the tension 
between purity and pragmatism and suggests that gulf between them is widening. But in the end, the 
authors conclude, both camps are needed for the environmental movement to achieve its objectives. The 
authors argue that the ability of more moderate, consensus-oriented ENGOs to operate as change agents is 
influenced by the presence of more radical, conflict-oriented ENGOs through what is called the “radical 
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flank effect.”8  The radicals, in effect, make it possible for the moderates to effect change. And yet, few 
ENGOs seem to recognize this fact.  
What many in the movement, and society as whole, fail to fully grasp is the extent to which the 
environmental movement is a complex and interconnected network, one that includes corporations as an 
integral part. In fact, most ENGOs define themselves either in opposition or engagement with that 
element of the movement. This yields criticisms and acrimony from dark greens that the bright greens are 
“selling out”9 and accusations from bright greens that dark greens are irrelevant or unproductive 
distractions to substantive change. The reality is that the network of the environmental movement in its 
relationship with corporations has formed in an organic and uncoordinated way, with many ENGOs 
challenging and competi9ng with each other rather than working in a more concerted fashion. This 
dynamics seems particularly acute in Washington. But if we can look at this movement through a new 
lens – a network lens10 – we can begin to see ways in which to understand the diversity of ways in which 
corporations and ENGOs engage. By developing a clear “map” of the composite landscape of the 
environmental movement, NGO managers will be better able to consider their role and place within the 
overall network.  And the corporate manager can better understand where and how they can access it.  
With this kind of imagery developed, more structured and effective coordination and collaboration 
becomes possible.   
 
The Environmental Movement 
The term “environmental movement” is a misnomer, lumping together many organizations with 
varied interests into one category. The 6,493 organizations that filed 501(c)(3) forms with the Internal 
Revenue Service calling themselves environmental groups in 200511 cannot be clustered into one or two 
distinct categories. Some ENGOs are staffed with lawyers and scientists and work within existing 
institutions to bring about corporate and social change in a collaborative style (such as the Natural 
Resources Defense Council and the Environmental Defense Fund12).  Others prefer to remain outside 
those institutions, relying on less professionally oriented staffs and working in a more confrontational 
style (such as the Public Interest Research Groups and Rainforest Action Network).  Still others prefer to 
engage in acts of sabotage and deliberate violation of the law, leading the FBI to consider them terrorist 
groups (such as Earth First! and the Earth Liberation Front). Some seek to protect nature for its innate 
value (such as The Nature Conservancy and the World Wildlife Fund). Others seek to protect nature for 
the purposes of hunting and fishing within it (such as Ducks Unlimited and Whitetails Forever).  Some 
are explicitly organized to engage corporations (such as the Coalition for Environmentally Responsible 
Economies) and others avoid such engagement by explicit mission (such as the League of Conservation 
4 
Voters). Overall, the dimensions on which ENGOs differ are many. And as a result, these differences 
manifest themselves in a diversity within what we monolithically call the environmental movement.  
This diversity is an historical product of a steadily widening range of constituents, resulting in the 
continuing redefinition of its form and focus over the past century. For example, when conservation 
groups and a wilderness ideology prevailed in the early part of the 20th century, environmental policy 
issues were cast primarily in terms of managing natural resources for social benefit. As modern 
environmental activists entered the movement in the 1960s, the ideologies shifted, and the agenda 
priorities became the protection of natural ecosystems. With the entry of employee groups and community 
groups in the mid-1970s, the issues focused on work-place safety and community right-to-know. Then, 
with insurers in the mid 1980s came an integration of environmental concerns into standard risk 
management practices such as waste management and vulnerabilities to pollution liabilities.  In the early 
1990s, investor groups pressured corporate boards directly through proxy resolutions related to such 
issues as: the establishment of an environmental policy committee, revised health and safety policies, 
toxic wastes in ethnic/minority communities, controlling carbon dioxide emissions, and eliminating the 
use of specific compounds. And more recently, the emergence of customer demographics (such as 
LOHAS) has created a shift in the marketplace and the products that companies provide to serve it.13  
Most notable in this evolving collective is the increasing engagement between ENGOs and 
corporations, beginning in the 1990s. The earliest alliance was perhaps the National Wildlife Federation’s 
Corporate Conservation Council in 1982; while the most prominent example was the alliance between 
McDonald's and the Environmental Defense Fund (EDF) in 1990 to target waste reduction opportunities 
across the business.  As part of this 42 part comprehensive action plan, the alliance gained most visibility 
for facilitating the shift from polystyrene clamshell containers to paper wraps. As of today, many other 
companies, including Exxon Mobil Corp., The Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co., Eastman Kodak Co., 
AT&T Inc., Monsanto Co., The Dow Chemical Co, Wal-Mart Stores Inc., Coca-Cola Co. and General 
Electric Co. have engaged with ENGOs in a variety of formats and issues ranging from packaging to 
climate change. And yet, some ENGOs eschew such activity and view it with suspicion at best and 
derision at worst. Herein lies the provocative tension over the dark green/bright green ideologies.  How 
can we make sense of it? 
 
Beyond Dark Green and Bright Green 
To understand the complex and varied ways that ENGOs engage with corporations it helps to use 
social networking tools to draw a visual map of the movement. We can then look more deeply at the 
implications for how the movement operates and the various roles that ENGOs play within it. To begin 
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our network map I narrowed my view to the 70 largest ENGOs by budget. These range in size from 100 
members to 1.2 million (average 136,000); in budget from $1 million to $245 billion (average $18.5 
million) and; in date of formation from 1875 to 1995 (average 1958). Overall, while the sample is biased 
towards large national and international groups, it is a useful sample for developing a picture of the 
complexity of an influential segment of the environmental movement.  
Then, I analyzed the web pages for each ENGO to identify relationships with companies in the 
form of project partnerships, alliances, financial support or other mention of a joint relationship. Figure 1 
is a graphical representation of this network, and it immediately makes clear the dark green and bright 
green clusters. This is a “two-mode” network where the ENGOs are depicted as red circles while the 
corporations with which they are tied are depicted as black squares. In such a map, we can see certain 
populations or clusters of ENGOs that might not be otherwise visible.  For example, we can see 
graphically that 25 groups on the right have no business relations and form the dark green cluster.  
Further, we can see that 45 ENGOs within the network have relations with 664 Corporations through 869 
ties (with a range of 1 to 102 business ties per ENGO). These are the bright green cluster.  
 
Insert Figure 1 about here  
 
As we look deeper within the networked clusters, we also find that the ENGOs that defined their 
focus as “conservation” in the Encyclopedia of Associations14 were more central to the network than those 
that defined their focus as “environmental protection” or “pollution control.” Seventy-three percent of the 
conservation ENGOs had ties with business (total of 52, with an average of 13.3 ties per ENGO) 
compared with only 33 percent of the environmental protection ENGOs (total of 21, with an average of 
4.8 ties per ENGO), and 18 percent of the pollution control ENGOs (total of 11, with an average of 2.3 
ties per ENGO). The term “conservation” refers to groups that seek the preservation and protection of the 
environment and the natural things within it, some for its own sake, others for the benefit of human 
beings. “Environmental protection” is a broader term, addressing actions at international, national and 
local levels to prevent and, where possible, reverse environmental degradation of ecosystems. This term 
often has a legislative component to it. “Pollution control” refers to the direct control of emissions and 
effluents into air, water or soil from consumption, heating, agriculture, mining, manufacturing, 
transportation and other human activities that, left unchecked, will degrade the environment. These 
clusters represent three overlapping but distinct movements within what we call the environmental 
movement, with the former geared more towards protection of nature and the latter two focused more on 
challenging corporate activities. 
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But looking further, the organization and details of the network map tell us much more.  For 
example, by looking at the structure of the network, we can begin to see a diversity of positions. First, we 
can distinguish ENGOs between those in the core of the network and those on the periphery. ENGOs in 
the core of the map have extensive ties to the network.  This is measured not just in number of ties, but 
more importantly in the interconnectedness of those ties.  Think of a popularity contest or Google’s Page 
Rank when you think of centrality in a network map.  It’s not just the number of connections you have, 
but also how connected those connections are.  So, ENGOS like Conservation International, World 
Resources Institute and The Nature Conservancy (TNC) are highly central to the network and closely 
linked with much of its members. Second, moving to the periphery, we can see multiple positions as well. 
There are ENGOs that have many direct ties, but few link to the core of the network (such as Fish 
America Foundation and Rainforest Action Network), ENGOs with few direct ties and few links to the 
core (such as the Dian Fossey Gorilla Fund and the International Wildlife Coalition) and then there are 
some ENGOs with their own discrete networks with no ties to the core (such as The Wilderness Society 
and the Land Trust Alliance).  Corporations most central to the network map included: BP, Home Depot, 
Anheuser Busch, Bank of America, Citigroup, Coca-Cola, Consolidated Edison, Ford, General Motors 
and MBNA America Bank 
But this map looks only at the connections among ENGOs and specific corporations.  Is that the 
only lens to use to analyze this network?  If we categorize the companies by sector and redraw the 
network map using sectoral ties, new insights emerge regarding the types of corporate engagement 
employed by ENGOs.  Figure 2 depicts the ENGOs as red circles and the industry sectors with which they 
are tied as black squares. The first consideration in such a map is the clusters of commonality among 
ENGOs that share common sectoral ties.  Through such ties, we would expect ENGOs to share common 
types of information and common channels of influence.  We can see clustering along sectoral lines that 
have more clear delineations than the network based on specific company ties. For example, some 
ENGOs cluster in the northeast area of the map through their ties with sporting goods companies like 
those in firearms, outfitters and marine equipment sectors.  Another cluster of ENGOs forms on the west 
side of the map through their ties with resources extraction companies like those in the mining & metals, 
oil & gas and forestry & paper sectors.  And we can see that ENGOs like Conservation International, 
World Resources Institute and The Nature Conservancy again remain in the center while other, less 
connected ENGOs congregate around the periphery. 
 
Insert Figure 2 here 
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A second consideration with regards to sectoral ties is the diversity that each ENGO possesses. A 
lack of diversity suggests a more narrow set of interests being engaged between individual ENGOs and 
their corporate partners. Those with a narrow set of sectoral ties may be captive to the interests or 
influence of their network of corporate engagement, while those with a broader set may be independent in 
their ability to manage information flows. In short, those with greater diversity may be free to be selective 
about the types of information and influence they both project and receive. 
Finally, it worth noting that some distinctions emerge in terms of strategies as evidenced by 
network positioning.  For example, only 29 percent of ENGOs that identified their focus as “forestry” (in 
the Encyclopedia) had ties with “forest & paper” companies. This could be a deliberate attempt to avoid 
cooptation by the industries with which they target their activities or it could suggest a different definition 
of certain topics by ENGOs and corporations. Additionally, linkages among various sectors and topics 
can help understand the agendas at play and the constituencies that engage them. For example, on a 
humorous note, 100 percent of firearms companies have ties with ENGOs that also have ties with beer 
and alcohol companies; suggesting that it may be wise to stay out of the woods during hunting season!   
 
Differentiating Roles  
As discussed, two key ENGO distinctions emerged within our two network maps. The first is the 
positioning on the corporate map between the core and the periphery. The second is the diversity of 
sectoral ties that an ENGO possesses.  These dual distinctions create a matrix of five possible strategies 
that ENGOs employ to engage with corporations, shown in Figure 3. 
 
Insert Figure 3 here 
 
The choices that an ENGO makes on where to position itself within the matrix has important 
implications for the degree of autonomy and influence they wish to have. 15 Think of ties as channels of 
information and resources.  They allow ENGOs to influence the members of the network through the 
spread of ideas, but they are also channels that work in reverse. ENGOs may gain resources, like financial 
contributions, because of network linkages, and they may be susceptible to cooptive influence by the 
corporations with which they connect. Therefore, the ties in the network represent the dual (and at times 
competing) goals of gaining influence and remaining autonomous with corporations. The choice to 
integrate, with how many and with what kinds of corporations, then, becomes a strategic consideration for 
each ENGO. This strategy has both actual and perceptual considerations. Some ENGOs have a very clear 
motivation to remain autonomous by staying disconnected from the network, free to pursue and realize 
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interests without constraint from other actors in the system. But other ENGOs wish to influence change 
more directly with corporations by developing deeper ties with the network. This influence is a dyadic 
relationship. ENGOs influence the corporate sector through pressures for change, but corporations 
influence ENGOs as well. One measure of that influence may simply be that of money. And our data 
proves that out. In the sample of ENGOs, those with business ties had, on average, larger budgets ($24.3 
million versus $7.6 million).16  
So, in breaking out the roles that ENGOs choose to engage, the critical questions surround the 
extent to which they wish to remain autonomous and the extent to which they wish to have influence by 
integrating themselves to varying degrees within the network.  Each position carries with it a different 
role.  Below we can classify five roles based on the centrality they have within the corporate network and 
the diversity of those ties based on the sector network.  
The most obvious type of ENGO is that which is disconnected to the network, what we call 
isolates. Twenty-five of the 70 ENGOs in the sample (36 percent) fell into this category.  These ENGOs 
are the most autonomous from corporate influence; maintaining a sense of purity through that autonomy 
but wielding little power in influencing corporate activity directly. But this position also limits the 
ENGOs access to resources, such as large pools of funding from corporations. The motivations for this 
role can emerge in two ways.  For example, while Greenpeace and the League of Conservation Voters 
both make it clear that they do not work with corporations on their web page, their motivation is different. 
Greenpeace is more oppositional in its posture, choosing to avoid direct ties with businesses because their 
mission is defined around terms of conflict, particularly around issues of nanotechnology and genetically 
modified organisms. But the League of Conservation Voters is more ambivalent, avoiding direct ties as a 
form of disengagement necessary to maintain its impartiality and objectivity around issues related to the 
environment. Regardless of the motivations, isolates form an ideological core that is divorced from 
concerns from the corporate sector. They can be seen as ENGOs from which the strongest statements and 
ideas about environmental protection can emerge, but also ENGOs that must rely on others to bring them 
into practice. These ENGOs likely see themselves as the “true” supporters of the environmental cause. 
They are the most dark green environmentalists in the network. 
At the opposite extreme are the mediators, ENGOs which maintain a high number of corporate 
ties and a diversity of sectoral ties.  This role is embodied by some of the larger and more notable ENGOs 
in the movement, such as Conservation International, EDF, and TNC, with the highest annual budgets 
(average $56 million)17 and the highest membership (average 493,000) among the role types in the 
network (see figure 4).  These organizations operate with a more pragmatic strategy than the others, fully 
engaging the corporate community through tight connections in the network. They have tremendous 
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convening power for promoting change, and are best positioned to drive discussion and debate over 
particular issues. They maintain greater autonomy through their limited dependence on one sector while 
also maximizing their ability to influence change through their large number of corporate ties. As such, 
these ENGOs are the most instrumental in diffusing new ideas and practices within the cprorate sector. 
But, these ENGOs also run risks from such tight connections to the corporate network. These risks 
include concerns for cooptation and mission deflection as they seek to satisfy the interests of key 
benefactors. These are the brightest of the bright greens.  
 
Insert Figure 4 here 
 
In between these two extremes lie three hybrid roles that ENGOs can employ. The first is that of 
the independents, ENGOs located at the periphery of the corporate network, but maintaining a variety of 
sectoral ties through which to engage the network. This role includes ENGOs like Land Trust Alliances, 
the Sierra Club and the Wilderness Society as well as many of the hunting and fishing organizations, all 
of which can be seen on the periphery of Figure 1 with discernable clusters of corporate ties. These 
ENGOs have more autonomy than many of the other roles in the network, shielding themselves from 
specific corporate interests by diversifying their channels of information. But their level of influence is 
equally limited because of their peripheral position. These ENGOs are entrepreneurs, and have increased 
latitude for generating innovative notions of change within the corporate sector that will be less 
influenced by the mass of corporate interests that engage with ENGOs. They can test new ideas in their 
proximity of the network, but they need engagement with mediators to fully diffuse them through the 
network. Think of them as incubators for change upon which the mediators can draw ideas and energy. 
A second hybrid strategy for ENGOs lies in a similar peripheral position as the independents, but 
restrict their engagement to a select cluster of sectors. These are the captives, ENGOs that maintain a low 
level of engagement with a more restricted set of corporate sectors. As they choose not to be central to the 
network, their information channels are constrained to a narrow set of interests and influence, which also 
helps to maintain a greater degree of autonomy. And yet, they enjoy greater certainty in their scope of 
control given the clarity and simplicity of their network linkages. Those hunting and fishing groups that 
are not found in the independents are found here, as are some ENGOs with more specific mandates such 
as the African Wildlife Foundation and American Rivers. These organizations may become vulnerable to 
the biased influence of one set of corporate interests and therefore limited in their autonomy to act 
independently. But they may be incubators for ideas and influence that remain localized and of interest to 
a specific cluster of the network and not the entire mass. 
10 
As we move to the core of the corporate network, we find our third and final hybrid role type, that 
of the bridge. These ENGOs are central to the network, such that they can exert influence on the other 
ENGOs in the network, but they maintain a narrow spectrum of sectoral ties. As such, they act as bridges, 
channeling between a specific set of corporate sector concerns and the rest of the network.  ENGOs such 
as Flora and Fauna International, Soil and Water Conservancy and the Center for Clean Air Policy fall 
into this category.  We can expect them to inject specific ideas and interests into the network and, through 
their central position, help to gain greater engagement among the other ENGOs within the network for 
their acceptance. But they are constrained in their autonomy from this narrow set of interests as well. 
 
Balancing Roles  
Regardless of which role an ENGO chooses to play, it must continually balance the tension 
between exerting influence over the corporate sector while maintaining autonomy from it.  And this 
tension plays out in the actions and behaviors of ENGOs on the ground.  For example, many hunting 
groups have struggled with this tension, recognizing the benefits of funding and influence that come from 
corporate partnerships, but fear the influence such engagement on the agenda and culture of their 
organizations. Trout Unlimited and Ducks Unlimited, for example, have engaged in delicate negotiations 
to bring their organizations into more close contact with corporations through their boards.  On the one 
level, they see a benefit in gaining influence in protecting hunting and fishing grounds through the 
contacts and financial support that corporate board members can provide.  On the other hand, they do not 
wish that influence to alter the historically grass roots and local character of their autonomous state and 
regional chapters. The issues that they most often engage center around the protection of valuable 
ecosystems that are spawning or nesting grounds for the animals they hunt.  So, the resources and 
influence that corporations provide helps in that agenda. But they wish to remain focused at the local level 
in their agenda setting.  To try to balance those competing interests, Trout Unlimited has created a two-
tier board that skirts the edges of the corporate network. One tier is that of the “grass-roots trustees” that 
are elected from the ranks of the volunteers. The second tier is that of “at-large trustees” that are officially 
nominated by the board for their philanthropic history and the social ties they have to other wealthy 
donors.   
This delicate balancing act can be seen by some as a slippery slope towards getting pulled into the 
gravitational pull of the powerful corporate network with which NGOs are engaging. One ENGO, TNC, 
found itself embroiled in controversy when that pull was seen as too trong by others outside the ENGO. In 
2003, the world’s wealthiest ENGO with over $3 billion in assets found itself the subject of a Washington 
Post exposé suggesting that, in the pursuit of influence, it had given up too much of its autonomy.18 While 
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TNC would be considered a part of the bright green movement and a mediator in its diversity of sectoral 
ties, critics charged that the organization had become too close to the corporate sector and that this was 
leading to questionable deals with private members. In the wake of this scandal, TNC was the subject of a 
federal inquiry and an independent audit, and was forced to distance itself from many of its corporate 
board members. This event highlights the concerns that many have with environmentalists becoming too 
close to corporations in general and the criticisms of bright greens in particular.  
One way in which ENGOs can address these competing tensions returns us to consideration of the 
network of organizations, and the opportunities created by coordination among role types.  Groups in the 
periphery of the network can play roles that those in the center cannot.  And if coordinated properly, they 
can create a change within the system through coordinated agenda.  For example, a peripheral ENGO 
such as Rainforest Action Network may threaten to protest a paper supplier such as Staples Inc. for the 
company’s limited offerings of recycled paper, while a mediator ENGO such as EDF may be able to work 
with the company to develop solutions. Exemplifying the positive radical flank effect, Russell Train, 
second administrator of the EPA once quipped, “Thank God for the David Brower’s of the world. They 
make the rest of us seem reasonable.”19 [David Brower was a prominent environmentalist in the 1960s, 
70s and 80s, and the founder of many environmental organizations, including the Sierra Club Foundation, 
Friends of the Earth, the League of Conservation Voters, and the Earth Island Institute who used 
aggressive and confrontational tactics to oppose dams in the Grand Canyon, the Alaska pipeline, the SST 
and nuclear power.] So, peripheral ENGOs can help mediator ENGOs stay clear on the environmental 
ideology and assist them in promoting it. 
Or, one ENGO may wish to attempt the challenging task of playing multiple roles within the 
network, such as that of both the autonomous isolate and the influential mediator.  EDF, for example, has 
shifted its tone and posture from its original unofficial and confrontational slogan in the 1970s of “Sue the 
bastards,” to its more collaborative official slogan of “Finding the ways that work” today.  But the ENGO 
did not give up its activist roots entirely. In 2007, when the energy company TXU proposed a series of 
coal-fired power plants in Texas, EDF staged protests and filed lawsuits.  Then, when invited to 
participate in the negotiations over the leveraged buyout of the company, they hired Perella Weinberg 
Partners, the boutique investment bank, to advise it on using Wall Street tactics in negotiating mergers 
and acquisitions. Rather than playing multiple roles within one organization, other ENGOs – such as 
Friends of the Earth, the League of Conservation Voters, Clean Water, the Sierra Club and TNC – choose 
to create multiple organizations to accomplish this task; such as a coordinated 501(c)(3) charitable 
organization, 501(c)(4) social welfare organization and Political Action Committee (PAC) to maximize 
their ability to maneuver within policy and social spheres.20 
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As should become clear, network positioning is critical for succsful advancement of an ENGOs 
agenda. But positioning should always be addressed with a careful eye for funding, membership, media 
attention, and ability to mobilize people – in short power to play the role of change agent. It is important 
for ENGOs to understand where their constituency lies and to position themselves in a way they are 
willing to support. Earth First! or the Earth Liberation Front, for example, find that culturally (and legally) 
illegitimate activities on the far extreme of the isolate position can further their goals and bolster their 
support within the narrow segment of society that endorse such controversial action.21 Other groups, such 
as TNC or EDF, prefer to work more towards the extremes of the mediator role, within the institutions of 
society and utilize legitimate market based activities to achieve their ends. When the position matches 
their constituency’s expectations, resources flow. But if an ENGO drifts too far from the expectations of 
their constituency, they may find membership and donations impacted. For example, in the mid-1990s, 
Greenpeace began to shift towards the core of the network by working with corporations in a less 
confrontational style. But members and employees became dissatisfied by the shift and the reputation of 
the ENGO suffered. To correct this repositioning, the group staged an “eco-commando” action on the 
Brent Spar oil rig in 1995, being sure to have the media alerted and on hand. This action reestablished 




The reality is that the general public refers to the “environmental movement” or 
“environmentalists” in monolithic terms, generalizing a collective of ENGOs into a cohesive whole. 
This perception fuels critics like MacDonald and Speth to criticize “the” movement for drifting too far 
towards the business and market segment. But the environmental movement is not one movement, as 
Neil Evernden, explains: 
 
"The term 'environmentalist' was not chosen by the individuals so described.  It was seized 
upon by members of the popular press as a means of labeling a newly prominent segment of 
society. . .In fact, the act of labeling a group may constitute an effective means of suppression, 
even if the label seems neutral or objective.  For in giving this particular name, not only have 
the labelers forced an artificial association on a very diverse group of individuals, but they 
have also given a terse public statement of what 'those people' are presumed to want.  
Environmentalists want environment — obviously.  But this may be entirely wrong, a 
possibility that few environmentalists have contemplated even though many have lamented the 
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term itself.  For in the very real sense there can only be environment in a society that holds 
certain assumptions, and there can only be an environmental crisis in a society that believes in 
environment."22 
 
Network mapping is a powerful visual tool for mapping the complexities of the movement. And 
the usefulness of maps cannot be underestimated for understanding where you are and where you are 
going.  This paper provides one such map based on corporate/ENGO ties as measured through web page 
citations. There are many other maps that can be drawn, depending on how you wish to draw the ties and 
nodes, each providing one more view of this complex movement into greater relief. Such maps are 
powerful tools for helping ENGO managers consider more coordinated action amongst each other. They 
can also be helpful for corporate managers to distinguish among potential ENGO partners. In either case, 
you cannot understand your place and role within the environmental movement without an understanding 
of the landscape. And with that understanding, you can more effectively achieve your goals. In the 
immortal words of Yogi Berra, “You got to be careful if you don't know where you're going, because you 
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Corporate Engagement Roles Employed by ENGOs 
 
  Position in the Corporate Network 

















Environmental Defense Fund 
National Audubon Society 
Natural Resources Defense Council 
Nature Conservancy 
Rainforest Alliance 
Wildlife Conservation Society 
Wildlife Habitat Council 
World Resources Institute 
World Wildlife Fund 
Independents 
Bat Conservation International 
Defenders of Wildlife 
Delta Waterfowl Foundation 
Dian Fossey Gorilla Fund International 
Ducks Unlimited 
Environmental and Energy Study Institute 
Fish America Foundation 
International Wildlife Coalition 
Izaak Walton League 
Jane Goodall Institute 
Land Trust Alliances 
Nat. Council for Air/Stream Improvement 










America the Beautiful Fund 
Center for Ecoliteracy 
Center for Health, Environment & Justice 
Clean Water Action 
Clean Water Fund 
Coastal Conservation Association 
Community Environmental Council 
Conservancy Association 
Earth Island Institute 
Ecological Society of America 
Environmental Action Foundation 
Environmental Assessment Association 
Forest Guild 
Friends of the Earth 
Global Warming International Center 
Great Lakes Fishery Commission 
Greater Yellowstone Coalition 
Greenpeace USA 
International Water Association 
League of Conservation Voters 
Marine and Coastal Management 
The Land Institute 
The Wildlife Society 
Water Environment Federation 
Waterfowl USA 
low Bridges 
Center for Clean Air Policy 
Fauna and Flora International 
Soil and Water Conservancy Society 
Student Conservation Association 
 
Captives 































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































rs mediators, ave 493 independents, ave. 112
 
 
























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































African Wildlife Foundation 65 $8 
America the Beautiful Fund 20 $5 
American Forests 117 $3  
American Rivers 32 $5 
Bat Conservation International 14 $3 
Center for Clean Air Policy na $1 
Center for Ecoliteracy na $1 
Center for Health, Environment and Justice 27.5 $1 
CERES na $1 
Clean Water Action 600 $9 
Clean Water Fund 700 $2 
Coastal Conservation Association 75 $7 
Community Environmental Council 0.9 $5 
Conservancy Association 0.3 $5 
Conservation International 71 $50 
Defenders of Wildlife 71 $7 
Delta Waterfowl Foundation 35 $2 
Dian Fossey Fund 5 $1 
Ducks Unlimited 733 $128 
Earth Island Institute 10 $1 
Ecological Society of America 7.4 $3 
Environmental Action Foundation 10 $1 
Environmental and Energy Study Institute na $1 
Environmental Assessment Association 8.2 $4  
Environmental Defense Fund 400 $45 
Fauna and Flora International 4 $1  
Fish America Foundation na $1  
Forest Guild 0.178 $1  
Friends of the Earth 26 $4 
Global Warming International Center 12.4 $75 
Great Lakes Fishery Commission 0.012 $12  
Greater Yellowstone Coalition 10.8 $2  
Greenpeace USA 250 $18 
International Water Association 6.85 $1  
International Wildlife Coalition 150 $3 
21 
Izaak Walton League 50 $4 
Jane Goodall Institute 13 $2  
Land Trust Alliances 0.9 $7  
League of Conservation Voters 40 $2 
Marine and Coastal Management na $6  
National Audubon Society 600 $44, 
National Council for Air and Stream Improvement 0.1 $10, 
National Wildlife Federation 44 $96 
Natural Resources Defense Council 550 $46 
Nature Conservancy 1000 $245 
Pheasants Forever 100 $20 
Quail Unlimited 55 $44 
Rainforest Action Network 35 $2 
Rainforest Alliance 19 $8 
RARE 2.4 $4  
River Network na $3 
Scenic Hudson 11.4 $3  
Sierra Club 550 $43 
Soil and Water Conservancy Society 11 $1 
Student Conservation Association 38 $20 
The Land Institute 2.2 $1, 
The Wilderness Society 255 $17 
The Wildlife Society 9.2 $2 
Trout Unlimited 130 $10 
Water Environment Federation 36 $18  
Waterfowl USA 20 $1  
Whitetails Unlimited 65 $6 
Wildlife Conservation Society 105 $95 
Wildlife Forever 65 $4 
Wildlife Habitat Council na $1 
Wildlife Trust 3 $3 
World Resources Institute na $10  
World Wildlife Fund 1200 $60 
Worldwatch Institute 2.3 $4 
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